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Résumé 
 
This paper looks at the recent past of the benefits system and 
employment services in the UK and how they have operated through 
more than five years of austerity. The UK presents an interesting case, 
as the unemployment rate following the financial crisis has recovered 
faster than expected. The major reforms to welfare-to-work 
programmes and cuts to the public sector, together with continued 
labour market flexibility, have been identified as the source of this 
triumph. Yet behind this apparent success story is another picture. Many 
public employment service programmes in the UK were contracted out 
to private employment agencies following the Coalition Government’s 
2011 reforms. A much more restrictive and punitive benefits system and 
an emphasis on pushing people into work, whatever its quality or 
stability, has driven the rise of precarious and part-time employment. 
It is an important time to take stock of the effects of continued austerity 
and public sector job cuts, as well as the extreme shift to a deterrent 
model of benefit provision. Using the UK context, we might question 
what makes for a ‘successful’ story on job creation and what kind of 
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social toll there is to advocating “a job, any job” through the benefits 
and employment services systems. In particular, I suggest that by paying 
attention to the experience of those who use the benefits and 
employment services systems, we might learn about the effects of 
austerity and welfare reform on public services in a more meaningful 
way. 
 
 
Mots clés : Employment Services, benefit sanctions, austerity, welfare-to-work, 
welfare conditionality, job creation 
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Introduction 
In a report on the UK published in July 2016, the United 
Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights noted a 
number of deep concerns it had with reforms that had been made to the 
social security system. It cited: changes in entitlement and cuts to 
benefits; the benefit cap, which limits the total amount in benefits 
people of working age can receive; the removal of the spare room 
subsidy (or ‘bedroom tax’ as it is more commonly known); the four-year 
freeze on particular benefits; and the extensive use of benefit sanctions, 
which highlighted issues of an “absence of due process” and “access to 
justice for those affected.”1  
The nature of these concerns stand in contrast to the often 
triumphant tone of the body charged with overseeing social security and 
employment services policy in the UK, the Department for Work and 
Pensions (DWP). That same month, they announced another ‘record’ 
set of employment figures and an unemployment rate of 4.9%, down 
from its peak of 8.5% in September-November 2011 following the 
Great Recession. Indeed, the reforms to the benefits system and 
employment services, as well as the cuts to the welfare budget, have 
been cited as the reasons for the unemployment rate recovering.  
We might scratch beneath the headline figures for employment 
and unemployment, though, and take a look at how changes to 
employment services and the benefits system have affected those who 
rely on them, and how a more detailed picture of the labour market can 
tell us a different story. There have been significant changes to the 
delivery of employment services in Britain over the last five years, and 
while these are sometimes viewed as a mere continuation and deepening 
of previous reforms made under New Labour, here I suggest that there 
have been qualitative changes in the nature of provision. This has led us 
to a situation in which the latest reforms – namely the gradual 
introduction of Universal Credit, a single, monthly payment for people 
both in and out of work that replaces some of the previously existing 
benefits and tax credits – present claimants with a system of ‘ubiquitous 
conditionality’2 and what might be called a model of extreme deterrence.  
The contracting out and underfunding of employment services, 
the punitive approach to the administration of benefits and the cuts to 
the public sector, together with weak real wage growth and the rise of 
insecure work, present us with an altogether different impression of the 
UK labour market. With major cuts to the new flagship employment 
programme and the (mostly uncertain) after effects of ‘Brexit’ in store, 
including the eroding effects of inflation on frozen cash benefits, 
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prospects for a meaningful recovery in the labour market, built on good 
quality, well paid and stable employment, look slim. 
During the Coalition Government (2010-2015), changes to the 
benefit system meant that welfare spending was reduced by £17 billion 
up to 2015/16, and a further £12 billion in reductions are planned up to 
2020/21.3  This second round of welfare cuts, as well as changes to 
taxes, are expected to mean that living standards for almost the whole of 
the bottom half of the working-age income distribution will fall, 
heralding the biggest rise in inequality since the 1980s.4  
The paper is divided into four further sections. The first deals 
with the valorisation of work, and ‘hard-working people’, and the related 
stigmatisation of the unemployed and other benefit claimants in recent 
years. It takes a look at issues of low pay and insecure work that are 
often masked by headline employment figures. The second explores the 
different logics at play within employment services; in particular, how a 
punitive logic associated with sanctions has operated alongside a 
superficially caring logic that focuses on unemployment as an issue of 
physical and psychological health. The third section explores the great 
experiment of contracted out employment services that took place from 
2011 onwards. The conclusion reflects on the future of employment 
services and the emerging debates about radical reforms to the social 
security system that seek to do away with the majority of conditionality 
altogether. 
Work Ethic in Twenty-First Century Britain 
Employment and unemployment are deeply enmeshed: how we 
comprehend and measure the one will necessarily affect our 
understanding of the other. For example, today, as defined in the 
Labour Force Survey, anyone undertaking one hour or more of waged 
work per week is classified as ‘employed’. In these circumstances, 
employment comes to cover a host of activity between salaried work 
and intermittent jobs. To be strictly unemployed is an ever more niche 
identity. You may, for example, be claiming unemployment benefits, but 
still be classified as employed because you are engaged on a welfare-to-
work placement, in work experience or work-related training.   
It is important, then, to pay attention to the way in which 
employment figures are heralded, because it appears to signal a moral 
investment in work as something that is always and everywhere good. 
Much of the political contention around the Coalition Government’s 
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employment success story, especially around the 2015 general election, 
was based on questioning the (perhaps wilful) ignorance towards the 
nature and quality of work in contemporary Britain. This is particularly 
the case for the kind of work that is attained through employment 
services, as such work tends to be poor in terms of both security and 
pay.  
The discourse of work as an imperative is an evolving 
phenomenon. Under successive New Labour Governments (1997-2010) 
a new objective for policy was fashioned in the problem of ‘non-
employment’. It signalled efforts at an ‘active society’ in which 
integration into paid work would be the appropriate route not only for 
the unemployed, but also “for a range of identities previously 
constituted and provided for as the ‘non-employed’ – mothers, students, 
people with disabilities, [and] the partners of the unemployed.”5 Work 
became the measure of society as never before, and ‘worklessness’ 
among an inactive population was taken as illustrative of their being 
outside society. Increasingly, employment services sought to draw the 
whole household into the incentivization to work. 
This shift has been reflected, more recently, in the rise of 
rhetoric targeted at ‘workless’ households, intergenerational 
worklessness and the focus on family breakdown as a cause of 
unemployment.6 During the Coalition Government a set of ‘underclass’ 
tropes were revived, which attributed poverty, low levels of social 
mobility and unemployment to an etiolated work ethic, an absence of 
personal responsibility, but also drug and alcohol dependency, 
behavioural delinquency and criminality, broken marriages and absent 
fathers. These were captured in the dark image of a ‘Broken Britain’, and 
promoted by centre-right think tanks such as the Centre for Social 
Justice, whose founder, Iain Duncan Smith, was Secretary of State for 
Work and Pensions from 2010 to 2016.7  
Underclass rhetoric, and the images of ‘hard working people’ 
contrasted with welfare dependents, embodied in the distinction 
between ‘strivers and skivers’, has heightened animosity towards the 
unemployed and bred a distorted view of the labour market and benefits 
system. The mantra that work is the best form of welfare, though, has 
run into the issue of in-work poverty – in 2013, for the first time, most 
people classed as being ‘in poverty’ lived in a household where someone 
works.8 Squeezes on living standards and disposable income, owing in 
part to a mix of rising housing costs, freezes on pay and enormous cuts 
to local and central government services (the former having seen 
spending cuts of 37% since 20109), have called into question the claim 
that people are starting to feel the effects of economic recovery. 
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Other aspects of the labour market further complicate the 
picture. Self-employment has boomed in the last decade, with an 
estimated one in seven (nearly 5 million workers) currently working on 
their own account. Their earnings are not captured in official statistics, 
but a recent study calculated that typical earnings were lower in 2014-15 
than they were in 1994-5 for this group.10 Low pay in the UK is an 
enduring problem, with roughly a fifth of employees on less than two-
thirds of median pay. The most insecure forms of employment, such as 
zero hour contracts, are concentrated among the young and put them at 
risk of progressing both in term of pay and job security. Public sector 
jobs, which, where they were found in higher proportions tended to 
offer better conditions than the private sector, have been cut back on an 
unprecedented scale, and the regions and devolved nations outside 
London and the South East have borne the brunt of both cuts to jobs 
and services.11 Total public sector employment dropped by 373,000, or 
7%, between 2010 and the end of 2015, and local government 
employment by around 660,000 in the same period.12  
The situation, then, is one in which the imperative to work and 
the stigma attached to worklessness is prevalent in political and public 
discourse. Yet, at the same time, the rewards of waged work when set 
against the costs of living are much worse than before the crisis and 
have barely improved in years. In this scenario, it matters deeply what 
kind of support, as well as what kind of compulsion, exists within 
employment services. 
Punishment and Care in Employment Services  
Historically, a tension has been present at the heart of public 
employment services in the UK and elsewhere. They have existed to 
help the unemployed with finding work, through organising the labour 
market and providing a point of information exchange between workers 
willing to supply their labour and employers seeking to hire such labour, 
as well as administering benefits and offering various training 
opportunities. Yet, they have also acted to discipline the unemployed, 
compelled claimants to accept work or work placements and aimed to 
exclude certain groups from social provision. The first of these logics is 
what David Price, in his history of the public employment service in 
Britain, called the ‘labour market transparency model’; the second he 
titled the ‘benefit control’ model.13 Both logics can, and have, operated 
in tension with one another, ever since the founding of the labour 
exchange system in the early-twentieth century. 
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These logics, however, always operate through interaction with, 
among other things, a changing labour market and changing discourses 
surrounding benefits and the wider welfare state. In a further twist, since 
the late 1990s and the development of welfare-to-work or ‘workfare’ in 
the UK, systems of support and discipline have increasingly come to 
resemble one another. In 2001-2, the DWP was created, and the 
Employment Service and Benefits Agency were brought together in one 
place – the Jobcentre Plus (JCP) – in order to facilitate more efficiently 
the conditional attachment of social security to finding work, as well as 
encouraging work on one’s own employability. Today the JCP is 
explicitly designed to support a flexible labour market, and its benefit 
control logic has become part of this objective. 
Since 2012, as part of the push to boost the Government’s 
austerity drive and stated objective of reducing public spending, 
conditionality has been employed as an extreme deterrent to claiming 
unemployment and disability benefits. The gap between the number of 
people claiming unemployment-related benefits and the number of 
people experiencing unemployment grew from a difference of 472,000 
in 2007 to 684,000 in 2015, and fewer people are claiming benefits now 
than at any point in the last 15 years.14 A major part of the reason for 
this is that in October 2012 the Government introduced a new 
sanctions regime that was unprecedented in its severity. Under this 
regime, claimants could be sanctioned for a minimum of four weeks and 
a maximum of 156 weeks, or three years. In the 11 months between 
October 2012 and September 2013, 1.93 million sanction decisions were 
made, with 820,000 ‘adverse decisions’, where the sanction was applied.  
Sanctions, it seems, became a blunt tool for shifting masses of 
people off benefits and deterring others from starting to claim in the 
first place. One result of this has been a large rise in the use of 
foodbanks, and recent research has confirmed that areas experiencing 
high rates of sanctioning have experienced greater increases of 
foodbank use.15 There are questions over whether this policy of extreme 
deterrence appears to be effecting an off-flow of people from the claimant 
count without a concomitant in-flow into employment. A study last year 
found that each 100 ‘adverse’ (applied) sanctions was associated with 
42.4 fewer people on unemployment benefit. 16 The manner in which 
sanctions are applied and the legal recourse claimants have to challenge 
them has led the leading academic specialist to brand them the regime a 
“secret penal system”.17 
This punitive approach has been joined by a new policy agenda 
that is ostensibly caring in nature and that has sought to link work and 
‘wellbeing’ in a number of ways. Alongside efforts to make employment 
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services more personalised, there has been a great deal made of the 
health benefits, both physical and mental, of work in recent years. This, 
in part, has been linked to the long-term objective of moving people off 
out-of-work disability benefits, re-categorising them as ‘fit for work’ and 
placing them in more ‘active’, ‘job-ready’ benefit groups. Ken Loach’s 
latest film released in October 2016, I, Daniel Blake, has brought 
unprecedented attention to this agenda, demonstrating the struggles of a 
man with a serious heart condition who has nevertheless been deemed 
‘fit for work’. Between 2010 and 2013, over a million people on 
disability benefits had their eligibility reassessed through the Work 
Capability Assessment (WCA), a process that has, ironically, been linked 
with additional suicides and mental health problems.18 
The epidemiological approach to employment support has 
developed even further recently. The successor to the Coalition’s 
flagship ‘Work Programme’, begun in 2011, has been recommissioned 
as the ‘Work and Health Programme’, due to begin in mid-2017. There 
are recommendations for health commissioning bodies to help design 
the delivery of this new programme.19 Already to date, there has been 
controversial involvement from therapists and non-professionals 
employing ‘therapeutic’ approaches to employability within Jobcentres 
and private employment service providers. Critics have pointed out that, 
because of the architecture of conditionality and threat of sanctions, 
targeting claimants’ personalities and their attitudes towards work as a 
primary obstacle to them gaining employment represents a form of 
‘psychological coercion’.20 
Discourses of welfare dependency often present the idea of the 
rationally self-interested claimant as a subject who takes advantage of a 
lenient, over-generous welfare system that undermines the work ethic, 
permitting unemployment as a viable choice. Under the Coalition, 
however, new welfare activation techniques were developed that 
constitute individuals as essentially irrational in the welfare decisions 
that they take, as subjects who are unable to see what is best for 
themselves. An array of behaviour change techniques have been 
developed to tackle these irrationalities including ‘libertarian 
paternalism’, or ‘nudge’ policies, and positive psychology.21  
One peculiar way in which this manifested itself under the 
Coalition Government was in the rise of ‘character’ as a target of policy. 
In both education and employment services, character has been linked 
to the making of successful, morally aware, employable and socially 
mobile citizens.22 For example, the Behavioural Insights Team (BIT), 
the former Cabinet Office unit that has since been privatized, delivered 
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a mandatory psychometric testing programme to claimants, which 
assessed their ‘character strengths’ and sought to work on their positive 
dispositions.  
The BIT has also advocated the use of techniques such as 
‘growth mind-sets’ in order to boost ‘character skills’ and get claimants 
to think differently about their possibilities for attaining employment. 
The principal adviser on labour market issues at the BIT has talked 
about the importance of perseverance, and techniques that encourage 
“people to be more adaptable and essentially to work harder when 
confronted with challenges.” Those on disability benefits who are “less 
psychologically resilient” and struggle with change, he noted, can be 
encouraged “to act as if they have these character traits, whether or not 
they actually do”.23 
Aside from the resuscitation of what might be assumed by many 
to be a distinctly Victorian concept, the focus on character is further 
evidence of the increasing concentration on psychology and habits in 
explaining social problems. Work is posited as a panacea for social and 
health issues, including within employment service provision. But, as we 
shall see below, there is little concern for the quality of work, and 
approaching unemployment as an issue of moral and pathological deficit 
is both stigmatising of those who find themselves relying on the benefits 
system, and also develops a causality between personal attitude and 
gaining employment that unduly burdens individuals. 
Contracting Out and the Employment Services Industry 
The Coalition Government rolled out its major welfare-to-work 
scheme, the Work Programme, in 2011. This initiated a series of 
contracts between the DWP and private providers – companies, 
charities and social enterprises (for-profit and non-profit businesses 
with a social or environmental mission) – to deliver employability and 
training services to the unemployed, among other services such as job 
placement. Eighteen ‘prime providers’ – including multinational 
companies like G4S, Serco, Seetec, Maximus, A4e and Rehab – secured 
five-year contracts for the Work Programme in different regions of the 
UK. The list of organizations to which the provision of services could 
be sub-contracted from these ‘primes’ ran into the hundreds.  
The decision for increased contracting out displayed a 
fetishization of private-sector values and an ever-closer relationship 
between public welfare services and private business. Value for money, 
which was of primary importance in reducing the welfare bill, was 
supposed to be assured by a competition for contracts and ‘outcome-
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based’ payments – or ‘payment by results’ – to providers for successful 
job placement and employment retention for their clients. 
The way the funding model worked for the Work Programme is 
that providers received an ‘attachment fee’ for taking on clients from the 
Jobcentre, and then subsequent payments for ‘hard outcomes’: for 
placing someone in a job and for that person retaining the job. A 
‘differential pricing model’ applied to different categories of people that 
providers took on, so that higher payments were made for those with 
more ‘significant barriers to work’ such as those who had been on illness 
or disability benefit for longer, or who had drug addiction problems.  
The result of the marketized, ‘payment-by-results’ or outcome-
based model was that providers relied heavily on attachment fees (for 
merely taking on clients) and engaged heavily in creaming and parking, 
where easier-to-deal-with claimants are ‘creamed’ off the top and those 
with greater needs are ‘parked’ and recycled through programmes. A 
total of 1.2 million attachment fee payments were made in the first 26 
months of the Work Programme for JSA claimants in comparison to 
240,000 outcome payments, which are paid on evidence of a claimant 
sustaining a job for 3-6 months.24 By March 2016, for JSA claimants, the 
Work Programme had delivered 483,827 job outcomes, compared to 
843,000 sanctions and 881,615 cancelled sanction referrals. For those on 
Employment and Support Allowance (ESA), the benefit for those who 
are unable to work because of illness or disability, the figures were 
36,986 job outcomes against 175,000 sanctions and 162,970 cancelled 
referrals.25 
Government now spends around £187 billion on goods and 
services with third parties each year, about half of which is spent on 
services that are contracted out. Four firms – Atos, G4S, Capita and 
Serco – made £4 billion in 2012-13 from various government contracts, 
including with the DWP. 26  This ‘Public Services Industry’ was a 
significant feature of the Coalition Government’s period in office. In 
terms of what this signifies for the relationship between state and 
market, Colin Crouch has noted how, in the grip of neoliberal ideas, 
governments have increasingly moved their activities into the private 
sector in a process viewed as adjusting government to the market when, 
in actuality, it has adjusted it to the corporation.27 The effect is what has 
been dubbed ‘herbivorous capitalism’: “businesses operate in sheltered 
franchises grazing contentedly on the public purse and on the purses of 
private households”.28  
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Yet in the employment services industry, the margins are tight. 
Contracts were monopolized by large providers that sub-contracted to 
hundreds of smaller providers. This was because it was only those 
specialised in gaining big contracts that could manage the schemes in a 
commercially viable way. Within the different tiers of sub-contracted 
providers, smaller providers bore the risk of failure and there was a high 
rate of turnover through contract termination, especially for non-profit 
providers.  
The design and delivery of services for unemployed people was 
left largely to the private provider under what is called a ‘black box’ 
approach. The DWP had a hands-off stance and providers were 
supposed to design and deliver ‘personalised support’ as they saw fit. 
Reports indicated that, rather than tailored services, unemployed people 
tended to receive basic online support which saw them re-drafting their 
CV over and over and group sessions where they were told that their 
greatest barrier to work is not being positive enough. 
  Much of the official evaluation of welfare reform so far has 
concentrated on how well the contracting model has worked for 
providers, and whether it is providing value for money to the taxpayer. 
There has been little consideration of what it is like for an unemployed 
person to be told that the reason they don’t have a job is their lack of 
positivity. Or to be told that they must work in a retail position for more 
than 30 hours a week without any pay to fulfil the terms of their work 
placement. Or to realise that, as a lone parent, the increasing 
conditionality of the Work Programme wasn’t designed to take into 
account their childcare needs. Neither has there been attention paid to 
what kind of work people must undertake, whether it offers stability and 
a decent income or the insecurity of a ‘zero-hours’ contract. 
In general, as mentioned in the introduction, the UK historically 
has spent much less on active labour market policies than its European 
neighbours and shunned demand-side interventions for many years.29 
Unfortunately, the most recent comparable data on expenditure are only 
for 2010, but the figures show UK spending at 0.68% of GDP, 
compared to 2.98% in France, an estimated 2.18% in Germany and an 
estimated EU-28 average of 2.13% for public expenditure on labour 
market policies for that year.30 More accurate UK data for employment 
policy expenditure give figures of 0.31% of GDP in 2010/11, falling to 
0.2% in 2013/14.31  Of course, this expenditure rises and falls with the 
rise and fall of unemployment so comparisons are difficult and 
potentially misleading. Outsourcing, though, was undoubtedly seen as a 
means to greater efficiency (read savings) as part of a drive to reduce 
welfare spending.  
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In a move that shocked the employment services industry, the 
Government announced in the spending review of late 2015 that it 
would be cutting the money for contracted employment services by 
80%.32 No doubt this will mean that the Jobcentre Plus will take on 
more of the workload in future. But considering that the DWP has 
experienced large cuts itself in its budget and staff numbers, there are 
serious questions over what kind of service they will be able to provide. 
It is in this context of endless austerity and rising precarity for those in 
work and relying on the benefits system that the success story of UK 
employment is put into question. A clear concern with ‘quantity over 
quality’ in job creation, facilitated by a system of extreme deterrence in 
the administration of benefits and employment service should bring us 
to question the labour market accomplishments of the DWP.33   
 
Conclusion 
The argument set out here, that we must look well beyond 
headline employment figures and ask what kind of employment service 
system and labour market is serving people, is even more pressing in the 
short-to-medium-term future. The beleaguered system of Universal 
Credit is slowly being rolled out, replacing six different social security 
benefits and drawing both those out of and in work into its conditionality 
regime. Designed to ensure that work pays more than claiming benefits, 
it tapers payments as people move into employment. We face the 
perverse situation, though, where someone in work claiming it may face 
being sanctioned, because they are deemed to not be working enough 
hours. Mark Serwotka, head of the Public and Commercial Services 
(PCS) union, estimates that up to 40% of DWP staff might themselves 
be eligible for UC because of low pay. 
Brexit places new stresses on the need to develop a long-term 
plan for the UK’s sliding productivity and labour market conditions in 
general. Whether or not the referendum result will lock in further 
austerity, as the former Chancellor promised, or force the need for a 
more interventionist state, as some commentators are hoping it will, 
remains to be seen. Improvements in labour market programmes take 
time to reap results, and rely on effective coordination with other parts 
of government, such as further education. On the matter of further cuts 
to welfare, as noted above, the inflationary effects of a weak pound are 
set to mean an even greater real terms cut for those relying on benefits, 
with predictions that 11.5 million families will experience a 6% cut in 
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income equivalent to £360 per year, rather than the £260 they had 
previously been forecast to lose.34 
If there is a positive note to be made for the future, it is that 
greater scrutiny of low pay and sanctions by a range of think tanks as 
well as the wider public has put these issues on the political agenda. The 
Government’s ‘National Living Wage’ already appears to be having a 
positive impact on low incomes, without any obvious negative 
employment effects. At least in her speeches, Prime Minister May has 
acknowledged that many are struggling to ‘get by’. Equally, the negative 
effects of the sanctions regime – such as hunger, mental health 
problems, and further detachment from the labour market – have been 
documented by academics, campaign and voluntary sector organisations 
in detail and have inaugurated a series of reviews.  
Yet, there is an appetite for much more radical progressive 
reform to the social security system and labour market. For example, 
over the last few years Unconditional Basic Income (UBI) has moved 
from being considered an unviable fantasy to a costed policy that is 
debated as a serious alternative for the future of the welfare state.35 Two 
reasons for its appeal in the context of the analysis here are that it would 
displace the fixation on waged work as primary over other forms of 
work that are not always remunerated, such as informal care work. 
Secondly, it would totally overhaul the bureaucracy of intense 
conditionality and surveillance that has built up within the social security 
and employment service systems. This would leave an important 
vacuum needing to be filled by an institution that would provide 
occupational guidance in a radically different economy. 
Certainly, the imperative will be to move away from a social 
security system and employment service that views ‘a job, any job’ as 
better than anything else. In the same way that announcements of GDP 
growth are met increasingly with questions about what is being valued, 
we need to foster a growing awareness of the complications behind 
announcements of record employment – the quality of jobs, the 
unevenness of their distribution, and so on. At the same time, we need 
to pay attention to the voices of those who are being ‘cut out’ of 
welfare.36 Finally, despite six years of austerity, much of it still locked in 
for years to come, alternative economic visions might have greater space 
amid the radical uncertainty that is currently touching the country. 
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